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NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF TREBLE DAMAGE
ACTIONS: REFLECTIONS ON THE NEW
ANTITRUST STRATEGY
ARTHUR D. AUSTIN*
Since the passage of the Sherman Act' in 1890, private parties
have had the right to seek monetary compensation for injuries to busi-
ness or property resulting from antitrust violations.2 By allowing plain-
tiffs to treble their damage awards, Congress sought to provide the
private sector with the incentive to function as a self-policing sys-
tem3-the conventional assumption being that the plaintiff's sole ob-
jective in a treble damage action would be to extract monetary compen-
sation from the defendant.
Events unfolding over the past decade indicate that this compensa-
tion assumption is obsolete. Under the "new" antitrust strategy, man-
agement intentionally exploits the private suit to achieve
noncompensatory objectives. Treble damage complaints are now filed
in an attempt to intimidate defendants into modifying their conduct in
a way favorable to the interests of the plaintiff. The objective of the
strategy is to cause the defendant to "soften" the vigor of its competi-
tive tactics. The plaintiff assumes that a risk-conscious defendant will
acknowledge the ambiguities of antitrust precedent, recognize the un-
certainty of the outcome and, as a result, will avoid taking the chance
of exacerbating potential damages by continuing the allegedly illegal
conduct. Faced with this prospect, the defendant typically gives the
plaintiff various "business advantages" (such as supply contracts) in
lieu of a monetary settlement. Thus, the new antitrust strategy has
* Edgar A. Hahn Professor of Jurisprudence, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law. B.S. 1958, University of Virginia; LL.B. 1963, Tulane University School of Law.
1. Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7, 15 (1976)).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue.., and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee."
3. W. HAMILTON & I. TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 10, 82 (TNEC Monograph No. 16,
1940). The treble damage action is thought to produce three positive effects: deterrence, compen-
sation and plaintiffs serving as private attorneys general. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 745-47 (1977); see REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 378 (1955).
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achieved its noncompensatory goal.
This new antitrust strategy produces at least three detrimental ef-
fects. Existing problems, such as depletion of resources within the judi-
cial system and the drain on corporate energies, are aggravated. The
"softening" of competition in areas such as pricing has deleterious ef-
fects-particularly in highly concentrated industries. Finally, settle-
ments !hat establish business relationships between rivals at a mini-
mum can encourage a "quiet life" and, at the worst, constitute illegal
restraints of trade.
This Article surveys the new antitrust strategy. The discussion
proceeds through five parts: the first two sections recite the factors that
coalesced to produce the new strategy, while the third section describes
its emergence as a tactical weapon. The fourth part analyzes the effects
of this strategy on competition, and the conclusion summarizes recom-
mendations for remedying the situation.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW ANTITRUST STRATEGY
The impetus for the new antitrust strategy came from three
sources: first, managers overcame an entrenched bias against suing a
fellow member of the executive suite "club"; second, the Supreme
Court embraced a blend of economic theory and populism in an effort
to encourage private antitrust enforcement; and, third, the reform
movement "discovered" antitrust and educated the public to its flex-
ibility.
A. Antitrust Evolution and the Demise of the "Old Club Tradition."
Antitrust ideology has evolved through three "generations." Dur-
ing the first generation the judiciary sought to settle on a workable in-
terpretation of the newly enacted Sherman Act.4 This generation
ended in 1911 with the break-up of Standard Oil in an opinion that
introduced the flexible "rule of reason" as the primary guide for judi-
cial interpretation.5 During the second generation, extending from the
time of the Standard Oil case until the 1945 decision of United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa),6 illegality was determined by the
presence of "abusive" conduct-the beneficent monopolist was spared
while the abusive bully was deemed a violator.7 The third generation
4. See, e.g., W. LETWiN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF
THE SHERMAN ACT (1965); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIOINATION OF
AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1955).
5. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
6. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
7. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 448 (1920).
1354 [Vol. 1978:1353
NEWANTITRUST STR4TEGY
was conceived in the Alcoa decision when Judge Hand rejected the
"abuse" doctrine and channeled economics into antitrust ideology.8
Thereafter, the concept of market power rather than abusive conduct
served as the main theme in determining illegality.9
Antitrust litigation by either the government or private parties was
infrequent during the first and second generations of antitrust ideol-
ogy.10 Of the suits initiated, most were government actions. " The pau-
city of private actions was due to the formidable burdens of proof set
by such harsh tests as the "abuse" doctrine and a reluctance to violate
the code of the executive suite by suing "one of the boys." "[W]hen an
executive felt abused by 'monopolistic' competition, he took his
medicine quietly, if not altogether sportingly."12 By sharp contrast, the
third generation bristles with private litigation;13 as one experienced
practitioner has observed: "Perhaps the most visible change in the na-
ture of antitrust practice in recent years has been in the sheer magni-
tude of treble damage litigation."' 4
The demise of the "old club" tradition began with an avalanche of
private actions triggered by government convictions in the "electrical
conspiracy" price-fixing cases of the early 1950s.'1 Because of the
widespread publicity given the government actions, management
feared shareholder suits if they failed to assert obvious antitrust
claims. 6 However, these fears alone did not account for the bur-
geoning of treble damage litigation. By far the most influential stimu-
lus for increased resort to the private action came from two additional
factors: the populist tendencies of the Warren Court and the complete
assimilation of economics by the judiciary.
8. A.D. Neale has described Alcoa as "clearly one of the high-water marks of antitrust
.... .A. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 112 (2d ed. 1970).
9. See Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14 U. CHI. L.
REv. 567 (1947).
10. Between 1890 and 1938, private parties filed 175 complaints, only 13 of which were suc-
cessful. 1 S. WHITNEY, ANTITRUST POLICIES 21 (1958). For a comprehensive statistical analysis,
see Posner, .4 Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcON. 365 (1970).
11. Between 1890 and 1944, the Justice Department fied 630 complaints and the FTC filed
723 (restraint of trade), while private parties fied 693 actions. Posner, supra note 10, at 365-71.
12. Holsendolph, New Challenges in Antitrust, N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1973, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
13. In 1960 the government fied 87 complaints in federal courts; private parties filed 228. In
1977 the government fied 78 actions in federal courts while private actions totaled 1,611. TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) No. 302, at 7 (Oct. 13, 1977).
14. Handler, The Shifrom Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Anti-Trust--The Twenty-
hirdAnnual.4ntitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. RFv. 1, 4 (1971).
15. Id. 4-5; Special Report: Is John Sherman's Antitrust Obsolete?, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 23,
1974, at 47, 54.
16. See C. BANE, THE ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT CONSPIRACIES 50 (1973).
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B. Economics and Populism in the Supreme Court.
By 1960, Alcoa's influence had proved decisive; economics had be-
come the mainspring for resolving antitrust cases. Conditioned by the
government's persistent use of the economic brief,17 courts began to
rely upon a priori economic theory as the most convenient tool to
bridge the gap between complicated evidence and the ultimate issue of
liability."8 The Warren Court adopted the economic brief but blended
in a form of populism that exalted freedom of entry and equality of
opportunity in the marketplace. 9 Among the lower courts, it became
fashionable to evaluate market structure and then, under the guidance
of Industrial Organization Economics,2" to render near-conclusive as-
sumptions on conduct and performance.2'
These approaches resulted in a new set of proscriptive standards
that favored plaintiffs and in a new antitrust consciousness among
managers:
[B]oth directly and through its encouragement of public and private
enforcement, the Court has made the business community more
aware of antitrust than ever before. No major American corporation
would consider a merger today without first consulting antitrust
counsel. Businessmen now commonly talk about antitrust; internal
compliance programs have been initiated and carried out. One cyni-
cal friend suggests that antitrust is now the second most talked about
subject among businessmen, the favorite still being prices!22
C. The Reform Movement Pushes Antitrust to the "Outer Fringes."
Private antitrust activity received further encouragement when
various reform interests appropriated the antitrust laws to serve as in-
struments for restructuring society.23 Reformers have advocated an
17. See Austin, A Priori Mechanical Jurisprudence in Antitrust, 53 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1969).
18. Economic theory was exalted to the point that one commentator observed that "a rule of
law is required to be more consistent with economic theory than with past precedent." Brodley,
Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clay/on Acs-From Economic Theory /o Legal Policy, 19
STAN. L. REV. 285, 298 (1967).
19. See Kauper, The 'Warren Court' and the Anti/rust Laws: OfEconomics, Populism, and
Cynicism, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 325 (1968).
20. Industrial Organization Economics is the study of the factors that determine market per-
formance of firms and industries, e.g., conditions of supply and demand, market structure and
conduct. See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 2-6
(1970).
21. For an egregious example of the assumption of illegal conduct and effects from market
structure see Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970).
22. Kauper, supra note 19, at 335; see Carruth, The "Legal Explosion" Has Left Business
Shell-Shocked, FORTUNE, Apr. 1973, at 65.
23. Ralph Nader set the tone by announcing that "from the present on, antitrust and its brace
of phrases will start to become household words .. " M. GREEN, B. MOORE, JR. & B. WASSER-
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extremely broad range of objectives for antitrust law.24 Ralph Nader
believes that section 7 of the Clayton Act could be used to put an end to
"dehumanizing" assembly lines and to deconcentrate markets, thereby
erasing racial discrimination .2  The late Senator Hart argued that
those who violate environmental protection laws should be charged
with engaging in unfair methods of competition under the Federal
Trade Commission Act.26 The FTC is conducting an antitrust cam-
paign against "manipulative" advertising,27 while the Justice Depart-
ment has made an effort, albeit unsuccessful, to attack organized crime
under the antitrust laws.28
Private parties have embraced the reformists' visions of antitrust
law as a multidimensional instrument capable of achieving diverse
goals. The Wall Street Journal has observed that it is the private plain-
tiff who is blazing the new trails: "Increasingly. . .private plaintiffs
are using antitrust law as far more than a remedy for unreasonable
restraint of trade in its traditional sense."29 Some of the more innova-
tive private actions have sought to enjoin the enforcement of uniform
building codes,30 to force adherence to affimative hiring policies3I and
to prevent the alleged monopolistic practices of a charity.32 The malle-
ability of antitrust doctrines has encouraged parties to use the laws in
unique ways. Such use, however, has injected a degree of uncertainty
into the outcome of such cases.
II. EXPLOITING RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
Negative attitudes towards risk furnish the leverage for the use of
the new antitrust strategy. Evidence from business management stud-
ies, supported by socioeconomic literature, indicates that management
STEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE SYSTEM iv (1971). Business Week corroborated Nader's predic-
tion: "[O]nly a decade ago historian Richard Hofstadter wrote, 'the antitrust movement is one of
the faded passions of American reform.' Today it is the darling of reform." Bus. WEEK, Mar. 23,
1974, at 47.
24. See Austin, The Emergence of Societal Antitrust, 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 903 (1972).
25. M. GREEN, B. MOORE, JR. & B. WASSERSTEIN, supra note 23; see Marcus, Civil Rights
and the Anti-trust Laws, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 171 (1951).
26. Hart, The Quality of Lffe and theAntitrust Laws: A Viewfrom Capitol Hill, 40 ANTITRUST
L.J. 302, 305 (1971).
27. Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 1977, at 24, col. 1.
28. See Note, Antitrust Enforcement Against Organized Crime, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 307 (1970).
29. Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
30. Id
31. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA), No. 635, at A-16 (Oct. 23, 1973); id, No. 804, at
A-5 (Mar. 8, 1977).
32. N.Y. Times, Aug. 21, 1977, § 1, at 26, col. 1-2.
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is generally averse to risk.33 Risk aversion manifests itself in a firm's
commitment to extensive planning as a means of controlling the uncer-
tainties of the future and in a general avoidance of situations involving
risk.
Risk taking is popularly assumed to be an important source of en-
ergy for capitalism. The accepted convention is that free enterprise was
initially fueled by flamboyant personalities who purposely confronted
and defied risk in building industrial dynasties and amassing great for-
tunes. Yet an accurate interpretation of history reveals that the actions
of the Goulds and Drews were mere footnotes to the main text of chap-
ters dealing with the efforts of entrepreneurs to control risk.
The most significant development in the struggle to deal with risk
occurred around the turn of the century when strong-willed individuals
such as John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie created great con-
solidations of firms and, in thq process, professionalized management.34
The genius of the early entrepreneurs was in coordinating the differing
organizational charts of the merging firms into efficiently run, single
enterprises.35 The novel problems of large consolidations made it
impossible for the "rugged individualist" entrepreneur to manage
effectively without help -hence the appearance of a new class of ad-
ministrators who had little, if any, ownership in the firm and whose
primary function was to "manage. 36
The full significance of the split between ownership and manage-
ment received universal recognition in the 1932 Berle and Means
study.37 Their work identified a new managerial class, free from con-
trol by passive shareholders. The significance of the "split" is that
while both groups may share a common interest in profits, managers
are also driven by other aspirations. The primary goals of the manage-
ment class are continued growth38 and the survival of the firm, 39 both
33. See Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic
Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 693, 704-06 (1973).
34. Maurer concludes that these individuals saw corporate organization as involving some-
thing "more challenging than personal ambition." H. MAURER, GREAT ENTERPRISE: GROWTH
AND BEHAVIOR OF THE BIG CORPORATION 47 (1955).
35. Chandler traces modem management to the early consolidation wave, where complex
administrative problems were resolved by paid managers who had little stock ownership in the
new company. A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERI-
CAN BUSINESS 415 (1977).
36. Id
37. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
38. "The second imperative of the oligarch's theory of management is corporate growth.
Mortimer believed the chief executive needs bifocal glasses ... to see profit as the short-range
benefit for the company and growth as its long-range goal." D. FINN, THE CORPORATE OLI-
GARCH 128 (1969).
39. "But [the corporation's] basic purpose is simply to exist-to survive business cycles, to
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of which require effective planning.
Although the market system continues to attract strong personali-
ties, their energies now are channeled into group management ideol-
ogy, where the chief executive's primary role is to organize expertise
and institute consensus judgments." Expertise is derived from a range
of disciplines, all capable of delivering accurate information on market
trends. New techniques in psychology and sociology allow firms to as-
certain consumer inclinations with a high degree of accuracy.41 Con-
stantly improving technology expands the scope of knowledge and
thereby reinforces "planning intense" attitudes.42 As a result, the plan-
ning function has become a highly professionalized science that repudi-
ates individualism and hunch taking while encouraging a bureaucratic
mentality that exalts caution.43
Risk is anathema to the most vulnerable target of the new antitrust
strategy-the large firm. Since every decision by a large firm involves a
heavy commitment of resources, errors jeopardize or completely sub-
vert growth and survival. The planning "ideal" thus becomes control
over all events.' Under these conditions, managers are dedicated to
planning so as "to minimize uncertainty, to minimize the consequences
of uncertainty, or both."45
overcome inefficiency and avoid error... and to live beyond the lives of the men who are part of
it." H. MAURER, supra note 34, at 168; see H. KOONTZ & C. O'DONNELL, PRINCIPLES OF MAN-
AGEMENT 10 (4th ed. 1968).
40. Harold Geneen, a legend among contemporary managers, describes the ITT dedication
to group judgments:
More than 200 days a year are devoted to management meetings at various organiza-
tional levels throughout the world. In these meetings . . . decisions are based on
logic--the business logic that results in making decisions which are almost inevitable
because all the facts on which the decisions must be based are available. The function of
the planning and the meetings is to force the logic out into the open where its value and
need can be seen by all.
A. SAMPSON, THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF ITT 129-30 (1973).
41. See general, N. BORDEN, ADVERTISING IN OUR ECONOMY (1945); E. BRINK & W. KEL-
LEY, THE MANAGEMENT OF PROMOTION (1963); S. OTTESON, W. PANSCHAR & J. PATTERSON,
MARKETING: THE FIRM'S VIEWPOINT (1964); V. PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS (1957).
42. See D. BELL, THE COMING OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 197 (1963).
43. Gordon concludes that the professional manager, unlike the "entrepreneur," is cautious
and relies heavily on systematic research and planning. R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN
THE LARGE CORPORATION 322, 324 (1961). He also notes that directors are more cautious than
executives: "Even more than executives, directors have personally little to gain and much to lose
from approving decisions involving a high degree of risk." Id 329-30 n.21. Gordon's views are
supported by Breit & Elzinga, supra note 33, at 704-06.
44. Galbraith argues that this has, in fact, occurred under a technostructure of giant firms
that have expertly used planning techniques to gain freedom from the pressures of the market,
government and shareholders. J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
45. R. MARRIS, THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF "MANAGERIAL" CAPITALISM 232 (1964).
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III. RISK AVERSION: THE NEW ANTITRUST STRATEGY APPLIED
A. Uncertainty and Risk in Antitrust Litigation.
Despite the skills of management, what Fortune describes as the
"Disneyland of antitrust"46 constitutes a hazard that defies effective
risk control. "No matter how good his intentions, no matter how con-
servative and cautious his course after conferring with attorneys, the
risk of antitrust violation by a decision maker is always present."47 The
consensus among managers is that any complaint filed against the firm
presents a high risk of producing a loss of resources. Exploiting this
assumption, some firms use the antitrust complaint as an offensive
weapon to compel risk-averting defendants to modify their behavior so
as to avoid liability or to avoid enhancing possible damages. More-
over, confronted with the necessity to modify behavior, defendants will
adopt a favorable attitude toward settlement.
The new antitrust strategy achieves optimum effectiveness when
the complaint attacks the legality of conduct that plays a critical role in
the defendant's competitive success and that is subject to unpredictable
legal treatment. A firm's conduct in setting prices satisfies these condi-
tions. Pricing is an everyday event that attracts frequent and scholarly
study yet remains shrouded in mystery and controversy.48 Whether
firms price to maximize profits, whether they "administer prices" or
succumb to "mutual interdependence," are questions that have incited
copious, but inconclusive, commentary. Recently the controversy has
focused on the legality of such tactics as "limit" pricing, "umbrella"
pricing and "predatory" pricing.4 9
As a result of vague and inconsistent judicial treatment, dominant
firms risk liability regardless of the pricing strategy they adopt. Profes-
sor Scherer interprets Judge Hand's opinion in Alcoa as condemning
limit pricing." Professor Posner threads together the United States v.
46. Guzzardi, A Search for Sanity in Antitrust, FORTUNE, Jan. 30, 1978, at 72, 73. Guzzardi
observes that the antitrust laws "have become the most baffling and unpredictable of all the doc-
trines originated by government to control the behavior of business." Id 73.
47. Mussman, Antitrust Risk Taking by the Executive, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 394, 395 (1975).
48. See, e.g., P. AsCH, ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA (1970); F. SCHER-
ER, supra note 20; Bernhard, Competition in Law and Economics, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1099
(1967); Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws.- A SuggestedApproach, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1562
(1969); Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and
Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
49. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1975); Posner, Exclusionary Practices andtheAntitrust Laws,
41 U. CHI. L. REV. 506 (1974); Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89
HARV. L. REV. 869 (1976); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Wefare Analysis, 87
YALE L.J. 284 (1977).
50. F. SCHERER, supra note 20, at 460.
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United States Steel Corp., Alcoa, and United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp.52 decisions for the proposition that umbrella pricing
is preferred over limit pricing.53 The risks involved in any decision to
undertake a pricing strategy are emphasized by Professor Dewey, who
concludes that, under Alcoa, umbrella and limit pricing constitute a
"Hobson's choice" for a dominant firm:
If the monopolist responds to the threat of potential competition by
keeping prices low in order to ensure that it does not materialize as
actual competition, he violates the law. If, disdainful of anyone's
ability to challenge his position, he charges what the traffic will bear,
his monopoly power is presumably "unreasonably" exercised. 4
Operating under the threat of this "Hobson's choice," a rational man-
agement will respond to a treble damage complaint by "softening" its
pricing strategy in a way calculated to deflect the plaintiff's charges.
The most difficult pricing allegation to defend against-and there-
fore the one with the highest risk factor-is "predatory" pricing. This
allegation intimidates because of the vague or overly complicated defi-
nitions that are applied in determining illegality. Some of the decisions
resolve the issue on the basis of the defendant's intent-a standard that
is both nebulous and incapable of distinguishing anticompetitive pric-
ing from efficient pricing. 5 Although identification of inefficient pric-
ing under cost analysis is a more rational technique, it is also more
complicated.56 Thus, courts are actually motivated to revert to slippery
evidence of "predatory purpose."
The capriciousness and inexactitude of determining predatory in-
tent were revealed to risk-conscious firms in Telex Corp. v. International
Business Machines Corp.57 Confronted with a declining share of the
peripherals market, IBM formed a special "Peripheral Task Force"
51. 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
52. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), q,9'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
53. Posner, supra note 49, at 532.
54. D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW 239 (1959).
55. Judicial use of the term "predatory intent" is troublesome. Several cases hold that
from a finding of certain actions, the trier of fact may infer predatory intent, and from
this inference the proscribed inimical effects upon competition in turn may be inferred.
However, application of these principles is particularly difficult, for predatory intent has
never been clearly defined. Its appearance has been characterized by phrases such as
"putting a crimp" into one's competitors, punitively or destructively attacking other
firms, and acting vindictively with punitive effect. But any price decrease by a legiti-
mately competitive firm will necessarily have a non-remunerative effect upon other firms
in the market, if only by decreasing their profit margins.
International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714,722-23 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 923 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
56. This is well exemplified by the debate among Areeda and Turner, Scherer, and William-
son. See authorities cited in note 49 supra.
57. 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D. Okla. 1973), modified, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
423 U.S. 802 (1975).
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charged with the responsibility to develop "strategies to impede the
growth of IBM's plug compatible competition.""8 Directing its atten-
tion to the objectives of the Task Force, the district court found that
IBM's pricing policies were "predatory," despite the fact that IBM did
not price below cost, and indeed, projected a twenty-percent profit.59
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, noting that "these acts
...are again part of the competitive scene in this volatile business
inhabited by aggressive, skillful businessmen seeking to market a prod-
uct cheaper and better than that of their competitors. 60
Pricing is also vulnerable to the convoluted provisions of the
Robinson-Patman Act.6' Described as "one of the most tortuous legis-
lative pronouncements ever to go on the statute books," 62 the Robin-
son-Patman Act is generally recognized as constituting an unjustifiable
impediment to competitive pricing.63 The twisted and varied interpre-
tations of this complex law--"where, in some instances, violation can
hardly be predicted"---compel even the most dynamic and risk-hard-
ened manager to soften pricing policies upon the appearance of a com-
plaint.
The most favorable environment for the use of the new antitrust
strategy is in markets dominated by large firms. Closely scrutinized by
ubiquitous reform groups and, in many cases, already saddled with a
prior antitrust record with the government, large firms are psychologi-
cally conditioned to avoid potentially damaging confrontations with
the antitrust laws. Judge Hand's suggestion in the Alcoa decision that
dominant firms are bound to a higher standard of conduct in dealing
with smaller rivals 65 is now folklore. Every manager knows that ma-
neuvers "honestly industrial" when practiced by a small firm take on
antitrust coloration when performed by a large firm.66 Thus, large
58. 367 F. Supp. at 293.
59. Id
60. 510 F.2d 894, 928 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). See 60 VA. L. REV. 884
(1974).
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976).
62. J. DIRLAM & A. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST
POLICY 119 (1954).
63. Levi notes that the Robinson-Patman Act "tends to be a price-fixing statute hiding in the
clothes of anti-monopoly and pro-competiton symbols." Levi, The Robinson-Palman Adc-Is It in
the Public Interest?, 1 ANTITRUST L.J. 61 (1952).
64. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 378 (1955).
65. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430-31 (2d Cir. 1945).
66. The real reason why some of the recent judgments in monopolization cases have
caused criticism and controversy is indeed the fear of business people that 'normal meth-
ods of industrial development' have now been given so narrow a definition that a
powerful firm has positively to 'pull its punches' to avoid giving an impression of unlaw-
ful intent.
A. NEALE, supra note 8, at 106.
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firms with dominant market power prove particularly susceptible to
this strategy.
B. The Emergence of the New Antitrust Strategy.
Management received a quick education in the dynamics of mod-
em antitrust strategy during the conglomerate merger wave of the
1960s. Borrowing from the exotic economic theories used by the gov-
ernment in its successful anticonglomerate blitz, many target firms em-
ployed antitrust litigation "defensively" to block takeover attempts by
unwelcomed acquirers. 67 The stereotype of the private action as exclu-
sively a source of compensation was dispelled, and a new role was rec-
ognized: an antitrust complaint could buy valuable time to marshal
resources and collect support to repel an invader.68 Experiences from
the conglomerate wars taught managers that the antitrust statutes are
flexible enough to support ingenious substantive theories and that the
possibility of judicial acceptance of those theories can never be disre-
garded.69 They also learned that the subtleties of Industrial Organiza-
tion Economics furnish a deep reservoir for imaginative theories that
can be used affirmatively against rivals.
It did not take perceptive managers long to put their education to
work for their practical advantage. The trade media now report on the
aggressive antitrust activities of firms almost as frequently as they print
new product announcements. The New York Times reports that
"[c]ompanies are now willing to use private initiative-and their own
dollars-to get relief from alleged monopolistic practices. Laws previ-
ously used to punish are now being used affirmatively."70 On occasion,
antitrust even seems to dominate a firm's competitive strategy.7 '
One of the most popular expressions of the new antitrust strategy
67. The classic example is Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d
506 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970), where the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
applied some "outer fringes" theories to help Allis deflect a takeover attempt.
68. See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 7 OF
THE CLAYTON AT 29-32, 56-59 (Monograph No. 1, 1977).
69. See Austin, Conglomerate Merger: A New Source ofAntitrust Tensions, 21 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 181 (1970).
70. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1973, § 3, at 1, col. 1. Barron's was more succinct: "What passes
these days for anti-trust law ... boasts many dubious aspects, but perhaps none so pernicious as
the powerful incentive it holds out to litigious, dog-eat-dog competitors to employ it against their
business rivals." Barron's, Aug. 21, 1978, at 7.
71. This is exemplified by the battle between H.J. Heinz Company and Campbell Soup Com-
pany, which have exchanged bitter charges of monopolization in an effort to gain market success
through litigation. Wall St. J., May 30, 1978, at I, col. 6. Consistent with the innovative aspira-
tions of the new antitrust strategy, Heinz alleges that one way Campbell monopolized was by
using "saturation" advertising to sabotage its test marketing of a line of new soups. Id
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is to frame allegations so as to impose an affirmative duty on dominant
firms to protect smaller rivals from the possible adverse effects caused
by the surprise introduction of new technology. Bell & Howell's com-
plaint against Eastman Kodak not only sought injunctive relief con-
taining Kodak's future growth but also requested the court to order
Kodak to publish advance information on new film. According to
press reports of a 1974 settlement, "Kodak agreed to offer to Bell &
Howell and to other competitors advance information concerning Ko-
dak's development of new film, when such film cannot be used in cam-
eras already on the market." 72
The high antitrust risks confronting dominant firms and the "pro-
tectionist" demands of the new antitrust strategy were emphasized in
Berkey Photo's successful jury verdict against Kodak. Berkey argued
that Kodak had an affirmative duty to predisclose enough information
on new products to allow rivals an opportunity to "compete on the
merits."73 But perhaps the ultimate in "affirmative duty" arguments
came from the Purex Corporation complaint which argued that "be-
cause of its dominant position, [Clorox] had an obligation to give Pu-
rex, a newcomer, an opportunity to get established in Erie before
responding to the challenge. 74
The new antitrust strategy has also emerged in the computer in-
dustry where it has proven ominously successful. Since the govern-
ment's monopolization complaint of 1969, IBM has been challenged in
a growing number of private actions. According to Fortune magazine,
"[1]ike Gulliver among the Lilliputians, International Business Ma-
chines is beset by a swarm of vengeful competitors who are trying to tie
it down or break it up by antitrust decree. ' 5 By attacking the legal
propriety of IBM's pricing policies and its sales and distribution prac-
tices, smaller rivals have succeeded in inducing IBM to moderate the
72. Kohlmeier, Trust Busters Focus on Kodak, N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1976, at 1, col. 3.
73. Plaintiff's theory on the camera monopoly claim included the contention that if de-
fendant had given them advance information about the size and other pertinent qualities
of the new Kodakcolor II film, other camera manufacturers, including plaintiff, could
have geared up to be ready to compete on the merits with Kodak in offering cameras
suitable for use with the new film. Treating this aspect of the claim, the court cautioned
the jury that a company normally has a perfect right to keep its secrets, winning competi-
tive advantages by launching new and better products in its own way and in its own
time. Undertaking, however, to apply the teachings of the authorities on Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, the court went on to instruct that Kodak's monopoly power in film, if it
was found to disable competitors who could not offer cameras comparable to Kodak's,
might lead the judges of the facts to decide that the failure to give camera makers the
necessary predisclosure concerning film should in all the circumstances be deemed an-
ticompetitive.
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
74. Purex Corp. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 419 F. Supp. 931, 940 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
75. I.B.M's Travails in Lilliout, FORTUNE, Nov. 1973, at 148, 149.
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vigor of its competitive behavior. Conduct modification was also con-
sidered to be an important by-product of the Control Data complaint.
Describing the "significant benefits resulting from the filing of our
suit," 6 the president of Control Data observed that "we found that
IBM marketing pressures that we had challenged lessened considera-
bly."77 Fortune also detected the moderating consequences of private
action pressures: "IBM tried to appease its critics by voluntarily reduc-
ing educational discounts and making other concessions to competi-
tors."78 In addition, beginning in 1969, IBM stopped "bundling" its
machine prices with its service prices and reduced the lag time between
new product announcement and delivery so as to avoid "premature"
product announcement allegations.79
The pretrial discovery process has given an additional edge to
plaintiffs by enabling them to get an inside look at the style and plan-
ning attitudes of IBM's management. Of particular practical signifi-
cance is the fact that rivals have gained access to candid self-
evaluations of technology. For example, the trial court handling the
Telex action allowed a trade association access to technological infor-
mation that was subsequently published, much to IBM's chagrin. Es-
pecially embarrassing was an evaluation by IBM officials of its own
equipment which concluded that it was "deficient" in comparison with
rival goods. An industry observer suggested that the dissemination of
this internal information was "one of the four or five worst things to
happen to IBM in the last two decades."80
From what is publicly known, it appears that the way to obtain the
maximum advantage from filing a treble damage suit against IBM is to
settle in exchange for various types of "business benefits." One of the
most impressive "business benefits" was obtained by Control Data,
which used the private suit as a lever to get IBM to sell its Service
Bureau Corporation-formerly a competitor of Control Data's
Cybernet business. As the president of Control Data correctly con-
cluded: "The decision to file a lawsuit in 1969, although difficult at the
time, has proved to be one of the best management decisions in our
history."' I Other plaintiffs have settled for less spectacular but equally
significant benefits in the form of supply contracts, 2 research and de-
76. Letter from William C. Norris, President, to Control Data Shareholders (Jan. 15, 1973)
(on file with Author); see iB.M. "s Travails in Lilipuut, supra note 75, at 150.
77. Letter, supra note 76.
78. IB.M. s Travails in Lii#put, supra note 75, at 150.
79. G. BROCK, THE U.S. COMPUTER INDUSTRY: A STUDY OF MARKET POWER 180 (1975).
80. Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1974, at 30, col. 1.
81. G. BROCK, supra note 79, at 172.
82. Applied Data Research, Inc. (ADR) settled for $1.4 million as "reimbursement" for cer-
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velopment arrangements83 and technological exchanges.8 4
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW ANTITRUST STRATEGY
The new antitrust strategy produces three negative effects. First,
the number of "tactical" lawsuits of less than marginal substantive
tain costs, plus the establishment of a business relationship with IBM. The president of ADR was
quoted as saying that the two firms "are studying a business arrangement in which Applied Data
Research would serve as a supplier of Autoflow ... to IBM. This arrangement, when completed,
will result in at least $600,000 revenue to Applied Data Research over a period of three years."
Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1970, at 2, col. 2. Potter Instrument Co., a manufacturer of peripheral devices
that can be attached to IBM's central computing units, announced that in exchange for a $3.5
million contract to do "some product-development work" for IBM, it had dropped a state antitrust
action and had decided not to file a federal antitrust suit that had been under consideration. Wall
St. J., Oct. 15, 1973, at 11, col. 2. Sanders Associates received $10 million in IBM business: $4
million to develop computer-related products for IBM, $3 million for "certain production commit-
ments" and $3 million in exchange for patents and products in Sanders' inventory. A Sanders
official described the new association in these terms: "We feel the potential for substantial pro-
duction and a future business relationship between IBM and Sanders makes this arrangement in
the best interest of our company and its shareholders." Wall St. J., Jan. 28, 1977, at 4, col. 2.
83. Control Data Corp. settled for a variety of "business benefits," including four five-year
research and development contracts and the sale by IBM to Control Data of its subsidiary, Service
Bureau Corp., a supplier of computer services. The sales figure of $16 million was the "book
value," reportedly a very low estimate of the business value of the company. G. BROCK, stpra
note 79, at 172. In addition, IBM agreed not to compete in the domestic data service market for
six years, to pay $26 million towards Service Bureau employee benefits and to purchase services
from Service Bureau for the next five years. The Wall Street Journal concluded that the acquisi-
tion "may have boosted Control Data onto the top ring in the data-service industry." Wall St. J.,
Jan. 16, 1973, at 3, col. 1.
The most controversial settlement term called for the destruction of Control Data's computer-
ized trial information index. The index provided access to over 150,000 pages of IBM internal
documents and other material obtained by Control Data through pretrial discovery. Claiming
that the data bank had been an important source of information in its suit against IBM, the gov-
ernment charged that its destruction had a significantly adverse effect on trial preparation efforts.
Wall St. J., Jan. 26, 1973, at 38, col. 2.
84. Under the terms of settlement between IBM and Sperry Rand Corp. (Sperry), the two
companies entered into non-exclusive licensing agreements concerning the manufacture of
punched-card accounting machines and electronic data processing machines. See Wall St. J.,
June 12, 1964, at 14, col. 4. In addition, both parties consented to exchange detailed technical
information, while IBM agreed to pay Sperry $10 million over an eight-year period. G. BROCK,
supra note 79, at 167. As discussed at text accompanying notes 102-105 infra, subsequent litiga-
tion revealed that the licensing exchange and information sharing were an illegal restraint of
trade.
Business Supplies Corp. of America and IBM settled a suit by agreeing to a cross-license
patent for certain punched cards and the machines to make them. Wall St. J., Dec. 21, 1965, at 26,
col. 3. In the Eaton Allen Corp. litigation, the settlement provided for Eaton to pay IBM $160,000
over an eight-year period in exchange for licenses to manufacture existing typewriter ribbon car-
tridges. IBM received Eaton licenses for certain correctional material patents and agreed to pay
Eaton $200,000 for "ribbon development." Wall St. J., Apr. 28, 1975, at 15, col. 3. In a pre-
complaint settlement, IBM resolved antitrust and patent infringement allegations by Ampex Corp.
with a cash payment of $13 million and by agreeing to an exchange of patent licenses "covering
their respective business interests in the data-processing field." Wall St. J., July 29, 1974, at 3, col.
1. According to a joint statement, "because of the exchange of licenses that will result, we believe
that both companies will benefit." Id
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merit is increased, thereby exacerbating existing problems. Second,
skillful use of the new strategy fosters a "quiet life" of coexistence
among former rivals. Finally, there is a clear danger that settlements
will orchestrate the spread of the "quiet life," leading to a further mod-
eration of competition or even to illegal restraints of trade.
A. Existing Problems Exacerbated
1. Frivolous Claims. So long as the purpose of an antitrust suit is
to intimidate the defendant in the exercise of his competitive instincts,
the outcome on the merits is considerably less important than the pen-
dency of the claim. Accordingly, there is a strong incentive to file mar-
ginal or meritless claims. This incentive is heightened by three
additional factors. To the extent that managers adopt a risk-sensitive
attitude towards antitrust claims, the costs to the plaintiff of supporting
litigation will be made up in benefits from the "softened" competitive
atmosphere. Moreover, because of the generality of the statutes and
the choice of a wide range of precedent, it is relatively easy to develop a
seemingly plausible rationale for a claim. Finally, because of the com-
plexity of antitrust issues, courts are generally reluctant to grant the
defendant's motions to dismiss or for summary judgment.85
2. Less Rational Antitrust Doctrine. Open-ended statutes give the
courts wide discretion in evaluating claims. The Supreme Court has
advised the bench and bar that the words of the Sherman Act have the
"generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable
in constitutional provisions."86 Many courts have misinterpreted the
Court's advice as an invitation to express value judgments in result-
oriented opinions of limited coherence and predictability. The conse-
quence is a crazy quilt of case law.87 By compelling the courts to evalu-
ate self-serving and substantively unsound complaints, the new
antitrust strategy makes a bad situation intolerable.
85. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 368 U.S. 464,473 (1962). Of course, attor-
neys should be cautious in forwarding frivolous claims on their clients' behalf since such conduct
could run afoul of DR 7-102(A)(1) of the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, which pro-
vides that "[i]n his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not ... [flile a suit, assert a position
...or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."
86. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936).
87. Judge Wyzanski has acknowledged that a
District Judge knows that he cannot give any authoritative reconciliation of opinions
rendered by appellate courts. And in connection with the Sherman Act, it is delusive to
treat opinions written by different judges at different times as pieces of a jig-saw puzzle
which can be, by effort, fitted correctly into a single pattern.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 1953), aj'dper
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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Antitrust law does not proscribe competitive warfare between
firms. "It is competition, not competitors, which the Act protects."'8
Yet a complaint designed to block a rival's competitive tactics necessar-
ily misdirects the court's attention from "competition" to the conse-
quences of legitimate market rivalry. It encourages judges to find
illegality merely from proof of the plaintiffs loss of business, a conclu-
sion that "is itself profoundly anticompetitive."8 9 Professor Posner has
summarized the dangers:
Students of the antitrust laws have been appalled by the wild and
woolly antitrust suits that the private bar has brought-and won. It
is felt that many of these would not have been brought by a public
agency and that, in short, the influence of the private action on the
development of antitrust doctrine has been on the whole a pernicious
one.90
Over the long run, a constant stream of new-antitrust-strategy suits
will have an adverse cumulative effect, ultimately engendering a nega-
tive reaction in the judiciary. Inundated with "intellectually disrespect-
able cases," 91 judges will develop a bias against the antitrust laws as a
credible means of monitoring competition. The net result is the under-
mining of legitimate and responsible complaints, including those of
governmental agencies responsible for protecting the public interest.
3. Delay. Antitrust suits are notoriously lengthy.92 The use of
the new antitrust strategy will protract actions beyond the limits of tol-
erance. Typically, delay is a defensive tactic designed to drain the re-
sources and wear down the resolve of the plaintiff. Where, on the other
hand, the function of the suit is to soften "hard" competition, there is
an incentive for the plaintiff to prolong matters by failing to pursue its
claim aggressively and by acquiescing in the defendant's procedural
ploys, thereby maintaining the influence of intimidation. Thus, for dif-
ferent reasons-plaintiff to sustain the threat and defendant to avoid
the risk of treble damages-both sides decelerate the proceedings.
88. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962). Unfortunately, the Court
rejected its own advice by adopting a small-firm protectionist view.
89. Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 363, 369 (1965). The au-
thors condemn the creeping growth of the "injury to rivals" test.
90. R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 288 (1976). Posner suggests
that the Burger Court is more conservative than the Warren Court and thus may restrain the
private bar. Id 229.
91. Baker, Book Review, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1978, at 2, col. 5.
92. The government's action against IBM is becoming one of the classic antitrust cases. The
suit was filed in January 1969, and the trial slowly winds its way toward 1980. Assuming an
appeal to the Supreme Court, "persons familiar with the suit now tentatively place the date [for a
ruling] as sometime between 1985 and 1990." N.Y.L.J., Mar. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 2.
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B. Anticompetitive Effects of the New Strategy.
The new antitrust strategy can subdue competition. Confronted
with a complaint, a risk-averting defendant will alter its behavior in a
way calculated to pacify the plaintiff. Two of the most critical and visi-
ble manifestations of competition-pricing and technology develop-
ment-are highly vulnerable to the new antitrust strategy. Since
complaints involving these complex activities are viewed as posing a
high risk of a successful treble damage award, conduct modification is
deemed a rational alternative. One consequence is that important
forms of competition are being tranquilized. Another effect is that
firms are becoming reluctant to engage in the normal expressions of
competition, opting instead for less detectable and, from a public inter-
est standpoint, less desirable methods of obtaining business.
To a small number of frustrated managers, bribery and disparage-
ment of rival products are attractive alternatives. However, the major-
ity of firms will switch to risk-free tactics such as heavy advertising and
product differentiation.93 Since none of the firms can accurately pre-
dict or measure the impact of product differentiation on sales or market
shares,94 this alternative constitutes an acceptable means of competing
that is not likely to provoke rivals to retaliation.
In terms of the optimum allocation of resources, resort to product-
differentiation competition will prove to be wasteful at best and, in
many instances, harmful to true competition. To the degree that the
advertising budget emphasizes imagery and trivial distinctions-and
passes on the cost to the consumer-resources have been inefficiently
utilized.95 A more detrimental effect may come in the form of higher
barriers to entry and in the intimidation of small rivals who do not
have access to "deep pockets."9 6
With respect to oligopolies, the prevailing view is that they are
characterized by poor performance in important areas such as pricing
and product innovation.97 In such markets, an important source of
93. In discussing the use of private antitrust actions against the "hard" pricing tactics of
rivals, Elzinga concludes that "one unfortunate result of this type of suit will be a lessening of
price competition, additional price rigidity, and a greater propensity for companies to use non-
price avenues of competition such as advertising and frivolous product differentiation." Elzinga,
Panel Discussion: Private Action-The Purposes Sought and the Results Achieved, 43 ANTITRUST
L.J. 73, 99 (1973).
94. See Austin, Antitrust Proscription and the Mass Media, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1031-33.
95. Scholars still argue over the effects of product differentiation and the extent to which it
constitutes a waste of resources. See INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING (H.
Goldsclunid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974); Austin, supra note 94, at 1029-36.
96. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578-79 (1967).
97. See R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRUCTURE, CONDUCT, PERFORMANCE (4th ed.
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competition can come from small, dynamic and risk-preferring firms.
The policy of the Justice Department is to protect and encourage such
competition.98 However, when small firms exploit uncertainty and the
large firms' vulnerability to the Alcoa obligations by filing meritless
claims, these goals are undermined. By relying upon the new antitrust
strategy to soften competition, small firms are foregoing an opportunity
to become a dynamic factor in the market.
C. The Use of Settlement to Establish "The Quiet Lfe."
The goal of the new antitrust strategy is settlement in exchange for
"business benefits." Given the trade-offs involved, settlement is the
best risk solution for both sides. The defendant removes the risk of
having to pay a treble damage award and simultaneously gains the op-
portunity to cultivate a "quiet life." In exchange for giving up a claim
that drains resources and that may not produce a judgment, the plain-
tiff is rewarded with business advantages.
Settlement is especially attractive because, in most instances, the
terms can be hammered out in the privacy of the boardroom without
interference or supervision by a court, a governmental agency or ri-
vals.99 Under Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," a
non-class action plaintiff may withdraw, that is, may settle a suit, with-
out court order either before an answer is filed or upon stipulation by
the parties. Hence, while ostensibly ending a legal conflict to return to
the marketplace for revival of the traditional competitive battles, firms
can secretly effect contractual arrangements that might have adverse
effects on the interests of rivals and the public.101
1977); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS
(1965); F. SCHERER, supra note 20.
98. Under the "actual potential competition" doctrine the government seeks to encourage
firms to enter new markets either de novo or by toehold acquisition. See United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. FalstaffBrewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
According to Justice Department merger guidelines, the Antitrust Division will challenge
mergers regardless of market shares where one of the firms is "unusually competitive." UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES No. 8 (May 30, 1968), reprintedin [1977]
1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510.
99. The Sperry Rand-IBM settlement illustrates the advantages and ramifications of secret
negotiations. Concerned that "the largest patent deal in history would not be well received by the
public," Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., [1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) T 74,874 at 95,914 (D.
Minn. 1974), and recognizing that there would be serious antitrust problems if rivals sought, and
were denied, access to the information covered by the license arrangement, id at 95,913, IBM and
Sperry "agreed upon a closely worded and innocuous-sounding press release. . . [that] did not
contain enough information to make it self-explanatory nor to prevent it from being misleading as
to the true content of the technological merger ... " Id at 95,920.
100. FED. R. CIv. P. 41(a).
101. Under these conditions, the settlement is a contract, rather than a judgment. THE PRI-
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In their most mischievous manifestation, settlements can be used
to restrain trade in violation of the antitrust laws. In holding that the
Sperry Rand-IBM accord'012 violated the Sherman Act as a "technolog-
ical merger," the district court described a laundry list of anticompeti-
tive effects. "Technological peaceful coexistence"10 3 between two firms
controlling ninety-five percent of the industry stifled the growth of ri-
vals and the industry. The combined technological portfolios gave the
two firms an important advantage that had particularly serious effects
on smaller rivals trying to compete in an infant industry." Not only
was the dominance of the consortium assured, but the overall level of
technological progress in the industry was also impeded. But for the
dulling effects of the settlement, the incentive of each individual firm to
innovate would have elevated the state of technology. 0 5
While an individual settlement involving an exchange of business
benefits may not constitute an illegal restraint of trade, a pattern of
such settlements with smaller rivals could justify a finding that a domi-
nant firm has monopolized trade in violation of section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. 06 At the least, Alcoa and its progeny0 7 hold that a dominant
firm cannot exploit "the advantage of experience, trade connections
and the elite of personnel"'' 0 8 to engage in exclusionary conduct that
inhibits the competitive opportunities of smaller rivals. A policy of set-
tling antitrust claims by establishing a variety of ongoing business rela-
tionships with rivals could constitute a form of exclusionary conduct.
While the small firms are not excluded from the market, the ultimate
effect might be to minimize their competitive impact. Doing business
together will inevitably subdue the competitive antagonism between
the firms, reduce the smaller firm's commitment to technological inno-
vation and could eventually leave the small firm in a state of depen-
dence.
VATE ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT, supra note 68, at 19; see 5 MOORE'S
FED. PRACTICE 41.02(2) (2d ed. 1948).
102. See note 84 supra.
103. Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., [1974-1] Trade Cas. (CCH) 74,874, at 95,920 (D.
Minn. 1974).
104. [Slince 1956, all EDP industry members except IBM and SR (and CDC to a limited
degree) have been operating under artificial EDP market constraints imposed by having
had to compete against the combined technological portfolios of IBM and SR during the
critical starting and developmental period of the EDP industry.
Id at 95,918.
105. Id
106. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
107. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100 (1948); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), a 'dper
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
108. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945).
1371Vol. 1978:13531
DUKE LAW JOURATAL
A long-range ramification of this practice is that, as a dominant
firm establishes a network of business relationships through settle-
ments, the emergence of a marketwide ethos of accommodation be-
comes inevitable. The symbiotic association among rivals derived from
ongoing business relationships will dull direct competition and dis-
courage firms from entering markets where their "partners" are already
operating.
V. CONCLUSION
The conventional assumption that the treble damage action polices
the marketplace and deters violations is being rendered obsolete by the
new antitrust strategy. An increasing number of firms are exploiting
the private action to chill the competitive tactics of rivals. As a result,
the negative trade-offs from reliance on a private enforcement system
now outweigh positive effects. Under these conditions, serious consid-
eration should be given to turning over to the government exclusive
responsibility for enforcing the antitrust laws.
Exclusive reliance on the government would produce positive ef-
fects beyond the termination of existing defects in private enforcement.
An expanded program, supported by a bigger budget, should generate
a more effective detection system. Congress could be expected to fur-
nish the resources to obtain the computer technology and other innova-
tive supports necessary to streamline litigation. A centralized
enforcement agency could coordinate and impose a coherent and uni-
fied policy that provides the business sector with clear signals on per-
missible conduct. Moreover, the government would be able to act as
the exclusive antitrust advocate before the courts, increasing the likeli-
hood that decisions would blend into a rational body of law. Finally, a
single source of advocacy stands a good chance of bringing ideological
differences into sharper focus, making it possible eventually to settle on
a single goal.109
The hard reality is that, under the present political climate, repeal
of private enforcement is unlikely. Congress is inclined to expand,
rather than curtail, rights and remedies. '10 This mood is supported by
the vocal advocacy of the reformist-populist movement which holds
that the treble damage action is an inherent right under the "economic
109. This is undoubtedly an overly sanguine projection. As Bork points out, the government
has not made a strong record, frequently filing suits and presenting arguments that support the
inefficient at the expense of free competition. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT
WAR WITH ITSELF 415 (1978).
110. This is reflected in the Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat.
1383, and even more recently in S. 1874, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 12039-40 (1977).
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charter of freedom." In addition, an instinctive distrust of any exten-
sion of governmental power is likely to cost the support of the business
community. Finally, given the government's weak record to date, pro-
jections of an effective program from an enlarged role in enforcement
are suspect.
In the absence of termination of the private right of action, the
new antitrust strategy will continue to produce adverse effects. By de-
fault, the burden of neutralizing these effects falls on the judiciary. As
an opening step, courts should put plaintiffs to the test of proving harm
to competition, rather than mere loss of business to competitors."' In
addition, a closer scrutiny of allegations and more frequent positive
responses to motions to dismiss and summary judgment would make
managers take a more realistic view of the results of instituting a treble
damage action. The past record does not, however, indicate that the
courts have the inclination or the expertise to sift out actions reflecting
the new antitrust strategy from the valid claims.
The only tactic of the new antitrust strategy to which the applica-
tion of a legislative remedy seems feasible is settlement. Opposition is
unlikely to grow against a proposal that would not terminate the pri-
vate right of action. The most feasible plan is to require the parties to
submit copies of any proposed noncompensatory settlement to the ap-
propriate court and to the Justice Department. The Justice Depart-
ment would have sixty days to file a report with the court, summarizing
the effects on competition and advising the court on the merits of the
settlement. After receipt of the Department's report, the court would
have thirty days to approve the settlement, taking into consideration its
actual and potential effects on competition. The Antitrust Division
would then be given thirty days after court approval to take formal
action against the settlement."' 2
Two possible disadvantages must be weighed in assessing a court
approval plan. If courts are conscientious in scrutinizing proposed set-
tlements, an additional responsibility is added to an already burden-
some workload. At the other extreme, some courts may avoid engaging
in a thorough examination of competitive effects by perfunctorily
granting approval of proposed settlements. However, any increase in
the court's workload is counterbalanced by the involvement of the gov-
ernment. The court would have the benefit of the Justice Department's
expertise and advice in evaluating the settlement, thereby reducing the
I11. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1976).
112. This proposal is loosely patterned after the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828
(1976), which requires the Justice Department to submit evaluations of the competitive effects of
proposed bank mergers to the appropriate regulatory agency.
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burden on the conscientious judge and making perfunctory examina-
tion less likely. Another advantage is that the court can, where neces-
sary, assure confidentiality. Finally, the involvement of the Antitrust
Division is the most efficient means of assuring that the settlement is
consistent with the public interest and the goals of competition.
